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Abstract 
 
The ever-increasing use of information technology (IT) 
in business transactions greatly expands firms’ exposure 
to different electronic markets. This paper provides a 
framework to understand how firms can leverage 
different strategies across external financial markets and 
an internal resale market to improve overall profitability. 
We develop a model in which a group of risk-averse 
retailers sell a homogeneous product to their respective 
uncertain consumer markets. We study a scenario where 
an internal resale market can be constructed among the 
retailers and outside financial markets can be used to 
improve their ability to manage uncertainty. We identify 
strategies for retailers operating in these two types of 
markets. We examine under what conditions which 
strategy is preferable and what range of economic 
impacts the two strategies may offer to enhance the 
retailer’s competitive advantages.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
IT reduces coordination costs and transaction risk. 
Transaction cost economics predicts that significant 
reductions in transaction costs can enable new 
organizational and channel structures [11]. The Internet 
economy is changing the way firms interact with each 
other. As a result, new business innovations are 
increasingly relying on electronic marketplace solutions 
to create a significant organizational change consistent 
with the emerging business strategies.  
 
Prior research on channel structures focuses on 
supplier-retailer interactions in a linear supply chain 
system. Supply chains today are dynamic webs that are 
coordinated over the Internet. The Internet offers 
efficient communication and tight connectivity, opening 
new venues for trade. The new electronic market 
solutions include new market channels such as auctions 
and spot market for capacity [6]. By using these channels, 
firms can dispose of excess inventory or procure needed 
inventory and build flexible and responsive supply webs. 
The increasing use of auction and spot markets also 
provides firms opportunities for risk diversification. 
 
In addition, financial market innovation has offered 
firms new opportunities for managing risks in their 
supply chain. In the traditional domains of insurance and 
financial derivatives, new financial products are 
emerging to help firms transfer and repackage their risks.  
 
Firms should adopt an integrated approach to manage 
their business risks. Both the internal operational 
changes and the external financial market hedge should 
be aligned with organizational redesign. New institutions 
can be constructed and new alliance can be formed to 
facilitate economic activities in e-marketplaces if social 
benefits can be realized among a group of interested 
participants in the supply chain. This paper examines and 
compares the value of an internal resale market in 
presence of outside financial hedging opportunities. 
 
There is an increasing number of work on the impact 
of an electronic market on the supply chain performance 
(e.g., [7], [8], [9], [10]). However, how firms manage 
their activities across multiple different functional 
markets present new challenges. In general there is a lack 
of formal evaluation of the strategic potential of IT usage 
in organizations. This paper tries to provide some basic 
insights on the economic impacts of multiple electronic 
market structures on firm strategies. 
 
Toward this goal, there are two lines of research 
related to ours. The first is hedging operational profits 
through trading in the financial markets. The idea is that 
if there is certain correlation between some financial 
assets and the firm’s uncertain stream of profits, firms 
can use available financial instruments to hedge their risk 
exposure (see [3],[4]). Both Gaur and Seshadri (2004) 
and Caldentey and Haugh (2003) considered a mean-
variance newsboy hedge problem when the demand is a 
function of a financial index and some other noise that is 
independent of the price process. Under a different 
framework [2], Anvari (1987) studies the newsboy 
problem using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  
 
The second stream of research is to explore the risk 
pooling opportunities among peer retailers. In [1], 
Anupindi et al. (2001) considered a group of retailers’ 
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 inventory and allocation decisions when facing local 
stochastic demands. They proposed to store partial 
inventory at a central location. When uncertain demands 
from retailers are realized, they can easily transfer title of 
claims to adjust their allocation. In another context [8], 
Lee and Whang (2002) examined the impact of a 
secondary market on firm performance. Distinguished 
from the primary market where the retailers place 
inventory orders from the manufacturer, the secondary 
market is opened when uncertainty in demand is better 
resolved so that retailers can trade among each other 
their excess inventories associated with independent 
demand risks. 
 
There is a complementary relationship between 
financial hedge and operational hedge. Since a retailer’s 
demand is only partially correlated with some tradable 
financial assets, firm’s total risk is not fully hedgable. 
Aside from the incompleteness in hedge, retailers’ ability 
to hedge through financial markets will result in moral 
hazard problems – behaving too aggressively in 
inventory holding will increase the risk for leftover. We 
propose a resale market as a new institutional design to 
deal with these two problems in pure financial hedge. 
 
 The concepts of either hedging through financial 
markets [4] or constructing an internal electronic resale 
market [8] are not new. However, prior research focuses 
on one type of the market. What is the impact and the 
interaction of both markets on retailer operating policy 
and supply chain performance is unexamined. This paper 
tries to bridge this research gap.  
 
Both the financial market hedge and the resale market 
risk pooling exchange can provide certain means of 
insurance mechanisms for retailers’ risk reductions. In 
some sense, these two types of markets can substitute 
each other in their risk management functions. But 
having access to both will yield the most economic 
benefits. In this paper, we investigate the impact of 
different market mechanisms on risk-averse retailers’ 
hedging and operating policy and the supply chain 
efficiency. Specifically, we use the traditional 
newsvendor model as the base case for comparison. We 
compare three market scenarios: the access to resale 
market, financial market, and both. We discuss how 
different informational assumptions on markets give rise 
to different types of operational and hedging solutions. 
 
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we 
outline the basic model and examine the firm’s inventory 
policy when operating in either a resale market or a 
financial market. We present two strategies for firms 
when they have access to both markets in section 3. In 
section 4, we provide social welfare analysis and identify 
conditions under which one specific strategy is 
preferable than another. We illustrate our basic insights 
using a numerical example in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes our paper.  
 
2. The Model 
 
In this section, we study a model with I risk-averse 
retailers who order a homogeneous product from the 
manufacturer at a predetermined wholesale price.  
 
Assumption 1: The retailer has a mean-variance utility 
function 
( ) ( ) ( )U W E W Var Wλ= − , ,  1,...,R i Iλ +∈ =  
where W  is the wealth level, and λ  reflect the degree of 
risk aversion. A higher value of λ  represents a more 
risk-averse retailer. For simplicity, we impose symmetry 
condition on retailers. 
 
Assumption 2: The retailer’s demand is i.i.d. 
and ( )~iD F ⋅ , 1,...,i I= , where the distribution ( )F ⋅  
with support [ )0,+∞ , finite mean μ  and variance 2σ . 
Let ( )f ⋅  denote its density. 
 
We use the traditional newsvendor model as the base 
case for comparison. In the following, we investigate the 
impact of different market mechanisms on the risk-
averse retailers’ hedging and operating policy and the 
channel efficiency.  
 
2.1. The Decentralized Model 
 
The retailer’s optimization problem is to determine the 
optimal order quantity dQ  to maximize her utility: 
( )
( )
arg  min ,
min ,
d d d
i
d d
i
Q Max E r Q D sQ
Var r Q D sQλ
⎡ ⎤≡ −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤
− −⎣ ⎦
 
where r  is the fixed retail price, s  is the predetermined 
wholesale price charged by the manufacturer. The terms 
in the first line are the total net expected profit. Those 
terms in the second line are profit variance. 
 
Solving this optimization problem yields the optimal 
decentralized order quantity dQ  that satisfies the 
following equation: 
( ) ( )1 1 2d dr F Q r Q sλ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − Γ =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦               (1) 
where ( ) ( )
0
QQ F x dxΓ = ∫  (see Appendix for a complete 
proof).  
 
For the risk-neutral newsvendor, 0λ = . Equation (1) 
reduces to the risk-neutral order quantity, denoted by 
1 1n sQ F
r
−
⎡ ⎤
= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . So it is easy to check that the risk-
averse retailer’s order d nQ Q< . 
 
Further, from (1) we can see that the distortion from 
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 the risk-neutral level is affected by two parameters: the 
retailer’s risk aversion and the demand uncertainty 
reflected by demand cumulative distribution ( )F ⋅ . Hence, 
the decentralized order quantity decreases when the 
retailer becomes more risk averse and when she 
perceives the demand to be more volatile.  
 
2.2. The Resale Market Model 
 
Now suppose the retailers agree to set up a resale 
market to trade ex post. The timing is as follows. In the 
first period, each retailer needs to purchase two types of 
inventories with different procurement costs: the 
inflexible inventory rQ  that cannot be resold later at per 
unit cost s, and the relatively flexible inventory rq that 
can be resold in the resale market at per unit cost w. We 
impose the condition s w r< < to reflect the fact that the 
flexible inventory is more expensive. In the second 
period, the retailer’s demand is realized. The retailer can 
sell off excess inventory and buy additional inventory if 
needed at an equilibrium market price p. 
 
We assume that the exchange in the resale market is 
restricted to the retailers themselves and there is no other 
source of supply and demand. Since we consider 
symmetric retailers, in equilibrium in order for market to 
be clear it must be the case that for each retailer the 
expected total flexible quantity has to equal the expected 
total unmet demand. Therefore, we derive the following 
equilibrium condition:  
( ) ( )r r rQ x Q f x dx q∞ − =∫  
That is, 
( ) ( )( )1rr r rQq xf x dx Q F Q∞= − −∫              (2) 
 
Note that ( ) ( )rr r r rQQ q xf x dx Q F Q∞+ = +∫ . So 
( ) ( ) 0
r r
r
r
Q q
F QQ
∂ +
= >
∂
. Differentiating (2) we have 
( )1 0r rrq F QQ
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − <⎣ ⎦∂  and ( )
2
2 0
r
r
q f QQ
∂
= >
∂
. We 
have the following result. 
 
Lemma 1: The retailer’s total order quantity r rQ q+  
increases in rQ ;  her flexible inventory rq decreses in 
rQ . Further, rq is a convex function of rQ .   
 
The above result is intuitive because from Section 2.1 
we know that a retailer would like to choose a relatively 
high level of inventory when the demand uncertainty is 
low, and among which, the inflexible inventory level 
should be higher since it is relatively cheap. 
 
When a retailer chooses a high inflexible inventory 
level rQ , the possibility of unmet demand is low. The 
retailer needs to hold a low level of flexible inventory to 
satisfy the demand contingency.  
 
We further assume that the resale market equilibrium 
price is a linear function of the transaction volume. We 
count the match of one unit inventory between a buyer 
and a seller as one transaction. So the transaction volume 
equals to the total amount of sales (or buys, equivalently).  
( ) ( )r r r rQ qp A x Q q f x dx+∞+= − − −∫  
where A  is a positive constant. 
 
Notice that we impose a strong assumption that the 
resale market will always clear.  Note that the demand 
and supply in the resale market depends on the actual 
demand realized by every retailer. It is reasonable to 
assume that a large resale market provides an effective 
demand pooling mechanism through which one retailer’s 
shortage in inventory can be covered by other’s excess 
inventory so that the total consumer demand can be 
satisfied ex post. By pooling demand from different 
symmetric retailers, the resale market has a risk-
reduction effect for retailer’s operation.  
 
If the resale market is well structured, it should work 
like an insurance mechanism. By paying for the flexible 
inventory at the first stage and pooling their flexible 
inventory together, the retailer in fact is insured that the 
ex post unmet demand is satisfied at no additional cost. 
The kinked payoff structure we observed in the 
decentralized case will be reshaped and to be aligned 
with the realized demand fluctuation.  
 
Substituting (2) into the pricing function we have 
( )r r
r
Q q
Q
p A F x dx
+
= − ∫                            (3) 
 
Given the relationship (2) that must be held in 
equilibrium, the retailer’s first stage problem is 
simplified as 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2
0
 
. . 1
r
r
r
r
Q
r r r
Q
r r
Q
r r r
Q
Max r r sQ wq p q f x dx
p Q q x f x dx
s t q xf x dx Q F Q
μ λ σ
+∞
∞
− − − +
+ + −
= − −
∫
∫
∫
     (4) 
 
Note that since the total consumer demand will be 
satisfied ex post, the retailer’s expected profit variance 
will be the variance of the demand multiplied by a scalar. 
The third and fourth terms in the objective function are 
the cost of inventory for inflexible and flexible orders. 
The next integral is the retailer’s expected profit from 
selling her flexible inventory, and the last integral is the 
expected profit from selling excess flexible inventory 
after satisfying her own demand first. These expectations 
are calculated in anticipation of the equilibrium resale 
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 market price p. 
 
Solving this problem we have 
( ) 1r sF Q
w
= −                              (5) 
 
Therefore, 1 1r sQ F
w
−
⎡ ⎤
= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , which is an increasing 
function of w. This implies that if the cost for ordering 
flexible inventory is high, the retailers tend to hold more 
inflexible inventory. In addition, note that the order 
quantity does not depend on resale market price. This is 
because in equilibrium, retailers perfectly infer the 
expected resale market price thus making their flexible 
inventory order decision accordingly. On expectation, 
their cost and benefit on the resale market cancel off. The 
real effect is its risk reduction by the resale market’s 
function of demand pooling.  
Recall that 1 1n sQ F
r
−
⎡ ⎤
= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and r w> , we have 
r nQ Q< . Compare equation (1) and (5) we have the 
following relation between order quantities when 
retailers operate under different markets. 
 
Lemma 2: The retailer’s total order quantity when she 
has access to a resale market may or may not exceed the 
decentralized order quantity dQ .  Both rQ  and dQ  are 
less than the risk neutral order quantity nQ  . 
 
Lemma 2 tells us that constructing an electronic resale 
market may or may not increase retailers’ order, since 
the order quantity depends on the cost parameters set by 
the manufacturer. However, the retailers’ utility will 
increase since operating at the decentralized solution is 
always feasible. Having access to the resale market will 
bring additional benefit to reduce risk. 
 
Further we notice that if the manufacturer can impose 
a high enough price (w close to the retail price r) for the 
flexible inventory, the retailers’ order for the inflexible 
inventory will be close to the risk neutral solution. This 
reinforces the role of the resale market. When retailers 
are risk averse, they tend to order less than the risk 
neutral solution. But due to the resale market’s risk 
reduction function, the retailers will be willing to order 
close to their risk neutral solution even by doing so gives 
them almost no profit margin.  
 
2.3. The Financial Market Model 
 
Now suppose that retailer i find that her demand has a 
linear correlation with a tradable financial index iS , i.e., 
i i i i iD a b S ε= + + , ia  and ib  are correlation coefficient, 
and ( )2~ 0,i iNε σ  is a normally distributed random error 
with mean 0 and variance 2iσ . The risk-averse retailer 
could manage to hedge part of her risk through the 
financial market where iS  is traded. Note here we allow 
retailers to choose different index iS  as the hedging 
instrument as long as that index is publicly traded.  
 
We assume that the financial market is efficient and 
arbitrage free. Then all the contingent claims such as 
various types of put, call options can be effectively 
priced so that the current price should equal to the 
expected future payoff of those contingent claims. Based 
on this observation, the financial hedge has the effect to 
reduce the variance of some uncertain payoff but keep 
the mean unchanged. An obvious and intuitive hedging 
strategy is to hedge all the hedgeable risks in the 
financial market while leave the error term iε  untouched.  
 
Suppose the order quantity in the commodity market is 
fQ . The retailer’s profit is min ,f fiW r Q D sQ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ . 
Note that the payoff structure can be approximately 
replicated using a combination of the financial index and 
an option. We cannot exactly replicate the payoff 
because of the idiosyncratic component (the error term) 
in the demand. So the hedge is incomplete.  We assume 
that the retailer’s optimal hedging portfolio consists of 
short selling α  shares of the financial index and 
purchasing β  shares of call option with strike price iK  
with maturity in the second period (the same time when 
demand is realized). 
 
The variance of the profit is  
( )
( )
min ,f i i i i
f
i
i i i i i i
i
i i i
VarW Var r Q D S S K
Q a
ra r rb S rb S
bVar
S S K
α β
ε
α β
+
+
+
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−⎢ + + − − ⎥⎜ ⎟
= ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥
− + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Since iε  is independent of iS , by choosing irbα = , 
irbβ = , and 
f
i
i
i
Q aK
b
−
= the minimum variance is 
achieved by 2 2ir σ . 
 
Therefore, the retailer’s problem is 
( ) ( )
 min ,
. . 
f
i
f
f f i
i i i i iQ i
i i sK
Q aMax Er Q D sQ rb C rb S
b
s t C x K f x dx
+
+∞
⎛ ⎞−⎡ ⎤ − − + −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
= −∫
 
where iC  is first period price for the option with strike 
price 
f
i
i
Q a
b
−
, ( )sf x  is the density function of the 
financial index iS . The constraint is based on the 
efficient market assumption, i.e., the current price for the 
option should equal the expected payoff of the option in 
the second period.  
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Solving this optimization problem we have 
1 1f n dsQ F Q Q
r
−
⎛ ⎞
= − = >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
Proposition 1: With access to the financial market, the 
retailer’s order quantity fQ  will increase to the risk 
neutral level nQ . 
 
The intuition is quite clear. Due to the retailer’s risk 
aversion, she will order less aggressively than the risk 
neutral case. However, with the access to the finical 
market, the retailer can use the available financial 
products to hedge her payoff uncertainty. The reduced 
uncertainty in payoff will bring up the order quantity to 
the risk neutral level.  
 
3. Two Strategies Operating in Two Markets 
 
In section 2, we see that the resale market and the 
financial market have their own merits to deal with the 
retailer’s demand uncertainty respectively. If a retailer 
can have access to both markets, her optimal control 
problem would consist of a mean-variance trade-off and 
the interaction between operational inventory policy and 
the optimal hedging strategy. 
 
When the financial market and the resale market 
coexist, there are two possible strategies. Depending on 
which market (resale or financial) plays the primary role 
to remove uncertainty, we call the two strategies R and F 
respectively. 
 
For the first strategy R, the resale market plays a 
primary role to restructure the retailer’s profit uncertainty 
to match its demand uncertainty. Due to the direct 
correlation between the demand and the financial index, 
the financial market hedging strategy is simplified to 
trade the index only. Continue with the retailer’s 
optimization problem, the expected wealth can be 
expressed as 
( ) ( )
( )
0
r
r
r r r r
Q
Q
r
r r
EW r sQ wq p Q q x f x dx
p q f x dx
r sQ wq
μ
μ
+∞
= − − + + −
+
= − −
∫
∫  
The second equality comes from equation (2) and some 
simple algebra. 
 
Suppose the hedging portfolio consists of short selling 
α  shares of the financial index. Since in the arbitrage-
free market, the first period price for the index equals to 
the expected value of the index in the second period, the 
mean effect of hedging is zero. So the retailer’s optimal 
hedging portfolio should minimize the variance of her 
wealth. 
[ ]
( )
 i i
i i i i i
Min VarW Var rD S
Var r a b S S
α
α
ε α
= −
= + + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
By choosing irbα = , the minimum variance is achieved 
by 2 2ir σ . 
 
In the second strategy F, the financial market plays an 
essential role to hedge the major risk in the retailer’s 
profit uncertainty. A hedging strategy includes trading 
shares of the index and options. If all retailers can find 
outside financial market to hedge their primary risk in 
demand, then the resale market is used to deal with the 
idiosyncratic uncertainty (the independent error terms the 
retailers cannot hedge through financial markets). Note 
that the correlated financial index could differ, since each 
retailer’s demand is independently drawn from a 
common distribution. In addition, the error term variance 
could also be different. Since the error terms are i.i.d., we 
denote the aggregate idiosyncratic demand as 
( )2~ 0,d N Σ , where 2 2
1
N
i
i
σ
=
Σ = ∑ . 
 
Similar analysis can be carried out when we replace 
the distribution ( )F ⋅  with ( )N ⋅  and  ( )f ⋅  with ( )n ⋅  
in equation (2). 
 
( ) ( )( )1ff f fQq xn x dx Q N Q∞= − −∑ ∫            (6) 
 
 Note that ( )N ⋅  has zero mean but a large variance 
since it sums all the idiosyncratic variances, and ( )F ⋅  
has positive mean and smaller variance than ( )N ⋅ , 
compare (2) and (6) it is trivially held that 
f f rq q q< <∑  (see appendix for a complete proof). 
 
Proposition 2: With access to both financial and resale 
markets, the retailer’s order for flexible inventory under 
strategy F is less than that under strategy R. 
 
Here the resale market is not used to satisfy the total 
demand risk but only the idiosyncratic demand risk part. 
The systematic risk in the demand is dealt with by 
individual retailers and can be hedged by trading 
possibly different indices in the financial market. 
 
If neither resale market nor financial market is 
available, the retailer’s payoff exhibits a kink at the order 
quantity level. Compare the two strategies we find that 
strategy R can reshape the retailer’s payoff to align it 
with the demand uncertainty, thus enabling simple 
hedging strategy in the financial market (the simple 
index trading). In contrast, strategy F uses both options 
contract and the index to allow the retailer to hedge her 
payoff uncertainty and order up to the risk-neutral 
inflexible inventory level. In either case, the ability to 
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 access to both markets will increase the retailer’s 
expected utility. 
 
4. Performance Evaluation 
 
Since the total consumer demand will be satisfied ex 
post, the retailer’s profit will strictly increase if she 
increases her inflexible inventory level since the 
inflexible inventory is cheaper than the flexible inventory. 
On the other hand, increasing the inflexible inventory 
will possibly lead to leftover stock when the demand is 
low, causing a loss and reducing the retailer’s profit. 
 
Since we assume that the retailers charge a fixed retail 
price, and the wholesale prices for both inflexible and 
flexible inventory only matter how the manufacture and 
the retailers split their profits, we measure the total social 
welfare loss by the expected leftover stock. The resale 
market has the effect to maximize the consumer’s 
welfare by satisfying the total demand. The expected 
leftover stock is measured by r r rL Q q μ= + −  for 
strategy R and f f fL Q q μ= + −  for strategy F. From 
Lemma 1, we have Q q+  is an increasing function of Q . 
Since f rQ Q> , we know that f rL L> .  
 
Proposition 3: With access to both resale and financial 
markets, the strategy F leads to more social welfare loss 
than the strategy R. 
 
This result is not a surprise. If the retailer chooses to 
hedge her primary demand risk through the financial 
market, then she is tend to be more careless in ordering 
her inventory, as she knows that any of her potential 
future loss in operation will largely be compensated by 
her financial market gain, and vise versa. This is well 
known as the classical moral hazard problem [5]. 
 
Proposition 3 implies that the conventional wisdom of 
hedging a firm’s operational risk primarily through pure 
financial market is not socially optimal although from an 
individual point of view it is desirable. In contrast, 
relying on a resale market to reconstruct the uncertain 
payoff will yield less social welfare efficiency loss. 
 
The coexistence of financial market and resale market 
will enable different combination of operational and 
financial hedging strategies. To be accurate, we need to 
compare the total expected utility generated by the two 
strategies. By calculation, we derive the respective utility 
as 
( ) 2 2R r r iU W r sQ wq rμ λ σ= − − −  
( ) ( )
2 2
min ,f f i i i
f f
i
U W rE Q a b S
sQ wq rλ σ
⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦
− − −
 
Compare these two utilities we have the condition to 
identify which strategy is preferable.  
 
Proposition 4: With access to both resale and financial 
markets, retailers will prefer strategy R to strategy F if 
the following condition holds: 
( )
( ) ( )
min ,f i i i
r f r f
r E Q a b S
w q q s Q Q
μ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
> − + −
 
 
We can understand this condition as follows. Note that 
the left-hand-side μ  is the mean consumer market 
demand, and ( )min ,f i i iE Q a b S⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦  is the expected 
satisfied macro demand under strategy F. The difference 
of the two terms is just the expected demand loss in the 
two primary markets. The left-hand-side represents the 
total profit loss using strategy F. Since f rQ Q> , 
r fq q> , the right-hand-side is the procurement cost 
savings by using strategy F. Adopting which strategy 
depends on the tradeoff between profit loss versus cost 
savings. 
 
Note that in this inequality, retailer’s risk aversion is 
not a factor in influencing her strategies. This is 
primarily because financial market and resale market are 
substitutable hedging vehicles. Although relying on 
different hedging strategies, the retailers are able to 
minimize their profit risks to the same level.  
 
5. A Numerical Example 
 
To see the different impact of market mechanisms on 
the retailer’s operating policy, we present the following 
numerical example. For simplicity, we assume normal 
distribution for random variables. 
 
We assume the parameter values are: 
( ) 2
0.5,  1
8,2 ,  4
0.2
1,  0.2,  0.6
0.8
i i
i i
a b
S N
r s w
A
σ
λ
= =
=
=
= = =
=
 
 
So ( )8.5,6iD N . 
 
The risk-neutral retailer’s order quantity is 
10.562nQ = .  
The decentralized risk-averse retailer’s order quantity 
is 9.057dQ = . 
 
Strategy R:  
 
1) With primary access to pure resale market: 
9.555,  0.539r rQ q= = . The total inventory level is 
10.094r rQ q+ = . The resale market price is 0.42p = .  
 
2) With additional access to the financial market and 
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 using simple hedge, the retailer’s inventory policy 
doesn’t change, but the retailer’s expected utility is 
increased by  2 2 2 0.4ir bλ σ = . ( ) 5.866U W = . 
 
Strategy F:  
 
1) With access to financial market and using macro 
hedge: 10.562fQ = . The inflexible quantity is restored 
to the risk-neutral level.  
 
2) With additional access to the resale market, 
0.273fq = . The total inventory level is 
10.835f fQ q+ = . The resale market price is 
0.5775p = . The retailer’s expected utility is 
( ) 5.778U W = . 
 
Note that in this example we have the following order 
quantity relation: 
f f n r r dQ q Q Q q Q+ > > + >  
This illustrates that retailers will order more when they 
largely rely on external financial hedging opportunities.  
 
Moreover, strategy F generates more social welfare 
loss than strategy R. Strategy R yields higher utility for 
retailers than strategy F. Check back with the condition 
specified in Proposition 4, the inequality is satisfied. It 
does confirm that the retailer should prefer strategy R. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The growing use of IT in organizations enables new 
business models and support new business processes that 
lower firm costs and improve coordination. This paper 
provides a framework to characterize the economic 
impact and the strategic potential of electronic markets 
on organizations. We quantitatively measured the 
efficiency generated by new market coordination 
structures among economic activities. We then compare 
two simple strategies that can be easily implemented by 
firms to control risk and improve profitability. We 
further examined under what conditions which strategy is 
preferable. Our analysis provides insights on the strategic 
potential of managing interaction with different 
electronic markets to improve firms’ responsiveness to 
uncertain market conditions. 
 
One limitation of this paper is our strong assumptions 
on market clearance in the resale market where the 
realized unmet consumer demand is satisfied by 
reallocating flexible inventory from retailers. Although 
in electronic marketplace market clearing is easily 
achievable, it is hard to quantify what the smallest 
number of retailers should be and what level of flexible 
inventory holding are necessary in order to guarantee the 
resale market will clear ex post. One interesting question 
is whether there is possibility of consolidation or merger 
among retailers if the resale market can generate 
significant value or lead to less social welfare loss, as 
suggested by proposition 4.  
 
In this paper, we assume the manufacturer’s wholesale 
price and the retailer’s retail price are exogenously given. 
In a more complete market structure, we relax this 
assumption to allow strategic interaction between the two 
echelon supply chain players and examine the pricing 
decisions under a game theoretical modeling framework.  
In an extension of this paper, we further allow the retailer 
to have certain market power to choose profitable retail 
price by assuming a linear demand function in the 
consumer market. Future work could further explore the 
most desirable market structure and the optimal hedging 
strategy in both financial market and the resale market. 
 
An extension to our current model could be an idea of 
setting up a mutual fund among retailers. Instead of 
asking the retailers to find their respective best hedging 
instruments in the financial market, a mutual fund 
manager could serve as an intermediary to manage the 
retailers’ risks. Since the retailers’ uncertain demands are 
independently identically distributed, the mutual fund 
manager could extract a macro risk factor to hedge at an 
aggregate level. The cancellation of idiosyncratic risks 
among retailers could save the transaction cost. In 
addition, economy of scales in activities such as 
balancing portfolio or managing the mutual fund account 
can be realized. This could be a future research direction. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Equation (1): 
 
Calculate the retailer’s utility as: 
( )min ,d diW r Q D sQ= −  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0
0
d
d
d
Q d d
Q
Qd
EW r xf x dx r Q f x dx sQ
r s Q r F x dx
+∞
= + −
= − −
∫ ∫
∫
 
( )
( ) ( )2 22 2
min ,
min , min ,
d
i
d d
i i
VarW Var r Q D
r E Q D r E Q D
⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
0
2 2
02
2
0
 
1
1
d
d
d
d
Qd
Q
Q d d
Q d d
Max U W r s Q r F x dx
x f x dx Q F Q
r
xf x dx Q F Q
λ
= − −
⎡ ⎤+ −⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
− + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∫
∫
∫
 
FOC w.r.t dQ  we have 
( ) ( )1 1 2d dr F Q r Q sλ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − Γ =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
where ( ) ( )
0
dQQ F x dxΓ = ∫ . 
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 Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
 
By equation (1), 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2d d d sF Q F Q r Q
r
λ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− < − − Γ =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
The retailer’s optimization problem is: 
( ) ( )
 min ,
. . 
f
i
f
f f i
i i i i iQ i
i i sK
Q aMax r Q D sQ rb C rb S
b
s t C x K f x dx
+
+∞
⎛ ⎞−⎡ ⎤ − − + −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
= −∫
 
From options pricing theory we know that, for given, 
,i ia b , 0if
C
Q
∂
<
∂
. FOC w.r.t. fQ we have 
( )( )1 1 0ff i is i sf
i
C Q a
r F Q s rb r FQ b
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ −
− − − − − =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦     
   (6) 
where ( )sF ⋅  is the distribution for the financial index. 
By efficient market assumption, the current price for 
the option should equal the expected payoff of the option 
at time T:  
( ) ( )
i
i i sK
C x K f x dx+∞= −∫  
1 1
f
i i
sf
i i
C Q aFQ b b
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ −
= − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦                  (7) 
Substituting (7) into (6) and simplifying the expression 
we have 
1 1f sQ F
r
−
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
 
By equation (2),  
( ) ( )( )1
max ,
max 0,
r
r r r
Q
r r
i
r
i
q xf x dx Q F Q
E Q D Q
E D Q
∞
= − −
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
∫
 
Similarly, by equation (6), 
max , max 0,f f f fq E Q d Q E d Q⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − = −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑  
We’ve normalize the integration. Since r fQ Q< , the 
aggregation area for riD Q−  is greater than that for 
fd Q− . Therefore, r f fq q q> >∑ . 
Q.E.D. 
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